Wait, there’s more! This week, The New Yorker reported that Deng is responsible for the unholy alliance (Is that too cruel? Do I care?) between Trumpistan and Kushervania. That is to say, she brokered their reconciliation in 2008, when they briefly split due to that fact that Ivanka (who, as the magazine recalls, appeared in the documentary Born Rich “wearing a necklace with a silver cross”) was not exactly who Kushner’s mother imagined him standing under the chuppah with. And if you’re reading this, you know exactly what I mean (and honestly, hasn’t poor Seryl Kushner been through enough?)
http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/211056/wendi-deng-ivanka-trump-jared-kushner-instagram-dubrovnik
Rupert Murdoch and his ex Wendi Deng, who famously reunited them after Ivanka broke off the relationship, sore that Jared didn’t stand up to his father who insisted she convert to Judaism, according to The New Yorker.
http://forward.com/news/355360/is-jared-kushner-on-the-verge-of-becoming-donald-trumps-de-facto-president/?utm_content=daily_Newsletter_MainList_Title_Position-1&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Daily%202016-11-28&utm_term=The%20Forward%20Today%20Monday-Friday
VALID AND INVALID CANDIDATES
The Torah’s Approach to Conversion
Based on: Jewish Conversion, Its Meaning and Laws, by: Rabbi Yoel Schwartz, 1995, Feldheim Publishers, Pages 14-60.
To be valid, a conversion must be sincerely motivated, and accompanied by the willingness and opportunity, to observe the precepts. Insincerely motivated candidates, are unacceptable, and are to be rejected, even if we merely suspect their insincerity. Although the Talmud (Yevamos 24) rules that once performed, insincerely motivated conversions are valid, this statement requires much clarification, and is dependent on numerous, complex, factors.
The Talmud is speaking of situations in which mitzvah (commandment) observance is the traditional requirement for acceptance into Jewish society. When such is the case, even the insincere proselyte has to conform to the norm. Thus, of necessity, his conversion results in religious observance. Because our current society is free and permissive, conversion does not necessarily result in mitzvah (commandment) observance.
In addition, those who interdate or intermarry, are obviously totally uncommitted to Judaism, and it is highly improbable that they will build Torah homes, once their Christian partners have converted. It is highly unlikely, too, that a female proselyte, will be more observant than her Jewish husband, who by his very behavior, in chosing a gentile for a wife, demonstrates that he is far removed from Jewish values.
In the light of these problems, how do we procede when faced by applicants whose motives are ulterior?
a. The conversion of one who evidently has no intention to observe the precepts, who is merely mouthing a false acceptance declaration, is obviously invalid.
b. The conversion of one who did not present the court with sufficient guarantee that he would
observe the precepts, is highly problematic, and under certain circumstances may be invalid.
c. According to Maimonides: Laws of Forbidden Relations 13:12 and the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law) (yoreh De’ah 268:12), a person who has already converted for ulterior motives, but whose intentions at the time of conversion (regarding precept observance) are not known, is accorded the status of a doubtful convert. When he demonstrates, by his subsequent conduct, that he is indeed precept observant, he is accorded the status of a genuine proselyte. The reason we do not nullify his conversion at the outset, as in case “b,” is that we fear that as he uttered his acceptance declaration, he might have truly intended to observe the precepts. (Case “b”, involves a conversion performed without sufficient guarantee that the convert had fully accepted Torah observance.) (Recently, the Worldwide Central Rabbinic Committee for Conversion Matters, alerted converts involved in such cases to this problem. Since then, many conversions have been referred to the Committee. Each case was presented to Israel’s greatest rabbis for a decision. In cases where the convert was currently Torah observant, and it was not possible to ascertain exactly what took place at the time of his conversion, the Committee advised the convert how to procede.
(Note: We have not presented halachic (Jewish Law) decisions. A qualified rabbi or conversion court, must be consulted in each and every case. Our purpose is to provide a general understanding of the conversion issue.)
Sometimes, various arguments are forwarded to justify the validity of conversions performed for the sake of marriage. It is worthwhile to review these arguments and to point out their flaws.
The first argument is based on the principle that “devarim she’balev, einam devarim,” which literally means that “tacit thoughts are inconsequential.” Some people use this principle to prove that the insincere convert’s mental negations of the precepts, cannot nullify his positive oral acceptance of them. However, nearly all of our rabbinic authorities, assert that this claim is invalid. In Teshuvos Achiezer (111, no.26), HaRav Chaim Ozer Grodzinski maintains that one who mentally negates the precepts, while orally accepting them, is not a true convert. He bases his argument on the rationale that because conversion is in itself a “davar she’balev” “a matter of the heart,” it is the candidate’s inner conviction which determines the validity of his conversion. Other authorities invalidate the claim of “tacit thoughts are inconsequential” as it pertains to conversions, on the grounds that this principle applies only to matters of transaction, and not to ritual acts.
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein views the problem from a different vantage point. He accepts the argument that tacit thoughts cannot invalidate ritual acts. However, he points out that it is inapplicable in the case of such conversions, because the very marriage of a gentile woman to a non observant Jew, is equivalent to an open declaration that she will not observe the precepts. As we have already explained, this is so, because it is highly unlikely that the gentile member of such a union, will be more committed to Judaism than her remiss Jewish husband. Unlike mental or tacit negations, explains HaRav Feinstein, open declarations do invalidate conversions. When such cases appear before a rabbinical court, its members actually become witnesses to an acceptance declaration that is not sincere. Therefore, it is no longer a tacit insincerity, but rather an obvious one. As such, they are forbidden to sanction the conversion.
There are rabbis who permit such conversions, even when it is highly unlikely that the converting partner will observe the precepts. They base themselves on the principle advanced in the Talmud Shabbos 34, that “one who converted amidst gentiles, is still a convert.” This principle is referring to one who converted, even though he knew very little about the precepts, particularly the Sabbath. These modern rabbis claim that such candidates assume that the precepts are merely ceremonial and not obligatory, and therefore place them in the category of those who have accepted Judaism on the basis of a very meager knowledge. However, this argument is faulty for two reasons. Firstly, the Talmud is speaking of one who would observe the Sabbath, if informed of its laws. Generally, people who convert only to facilitate marriage, have no interest in leading Torah lives, and as such, cannot be equated with the above mentioned Talmudic archetype. In addition (as taught by the Chazon Ish: Rabbi Karelitz), the conversion of one who does not believe that the Divine origin of the Torah is the binding force of all the precepts, is invalid. As a rule, most people who convert for the purpose of marriage, lack this basic inner belief.
http://www.torahlab.org/community/article/the_torahs_approach_to_conversion/
This declaration that the convert was clearly lying about his wish to convert and accept mitzvos - that there was never conversion - is not some obscure minority opinion. It is clearly the view of the Achiezer and Rav Moshe Feinstein - amongst others.
The Achiezer says here that if the convert does not keep Shabbos and kashrus - that shows that the conversion was not sincere and never took place
Rav Chaim Ozer Grodinski(Achiezer 3:26.4):… Because
of this reason it appears that Rav Posen is concerned about conversion
these cases because they won’t observe the laws properly. However
according to what I have explained there is no concern for this since
they have accepted to observe all the mitzvos – even though it is true
that they have in mind to transgress certain mitzvos later out of lust.
However this intention does not disqualify their acceptance of mitzvos.
It is only where they specifically refused to accept mitzvos that their
acceptance of the mitzvos is disqualified. However where is clear that
after conversion they will definitely transgress the Torah prohibitions
against violating Shabbos and eating improperly slaughtered meat and we
know clearly that their conversion was only for appearance sake without
inner sincerity – it is an umdena demukach [a proven assessment] that
this that he said he was accepting the mitzvos was totally meaningless.
Consequently their acceptance of mitzvos is invalid [and they are not
valid converts].
Rav Chaim Ozer Grodinski(Achiezer 3:28): Concerning
the common practice of converting women who are married to Jews -
according to the straight halacha it is not correct to convert them.
That is because they are converting for the sake of marriage. Therefore
even after marriage she is prohibited to him as is clear from the Rashba
(#1205). While previously I had written to be lenient in these cases
and I based myself on the Rambam (Pe’er HaDor 132) and Rav Shlomo Kluger
also paskened leniently in an actual case. Nevertheless the fact is
that there is not genuine acceptance of mitzvos in these cases. It is
quite obvious that their hearts are not with the Jewish people since
they do not observe Shabbos or niddah and they eat unkosher food as I
wrote in the previous letter. This problem has already been noted by by
the Beis Yitzchok who concluded that a proper beis din would not be
involved in this. And regarding the issue of governing the non‑Jewish
children…However the writer is correct that a good beis din should not
be involved in this type of conversion. Nevertheless I don’t see that it
is proper that the rabbis of the generation should make an open protest
against conversion. That is because in the eyes of the masses it would
be viewed as a chilul HaShem to prevent the women to convert and in
particular their children since according to the straight halacha it is
possible to convert them.
Igros Moshe(Y.D. 3:106): A
candidate for conversion who does not want to accept a certain mitzva
is he a ger bedieved?… Concerning the subject of conversion, the vast
majority of them want to convert because of marriage and therefore
should inherently not be accepted. However if they were accepted anyway -
they are in fact valid gerim. This reservation about accepting converts
for the sake of marriage is true even if they accept all the mitzvos
since they did not decide to convert for the sake of Heaven. Therefore
it is obvious that there is suspicion that despite the fact they stated
before the beis din that they are accepting to do the mitzvos – that
they are not telling the truth and they need to be examined further.
This in fact is the intent of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12): When it
is known that they converted for ulterior motivation, they should be
treated with suspicion until that their righteous is established. That
is because since they converted for ulterior motivation, they should be
suspected that even though they have verbally accepted the mitzvos but
not in their heart. Since there is clear reason to suspect their lack of
sincerity, it is not considered a merely a possible mental reservation
which has no halachic significance (devarim sheb’lev). See Tosfos
(Gittin 32a) and Tosfos (Kiddushin 49b)…Therefore they
are to be viewed as doubtful gerim until their righteousness is
establish and then they are viewed as definite gerim.
Most of the time and perhaps all of the time when a Jew wants
a non‑Jew, that the Jew himself is not observant. Therefore it is not
logical that the non‑Jew who is converting for the sake of a Jew
will be more observant. It is as if we are witnesses that the non‑Jew
is not definitely accepting the mitzvos.
Therefore it requires a great
deal of deliberation in the acceptance of gerim. Unfortunately due to
our many sins the situation has degenerated in many places that they
accept these type of gerim – even G‑d fearing rabbis – because of the
pressure of congregants on them. Therefore it is very
critical to fix and create protective measures to stop this great
breakdown of the system. It is certain because of these problems that
the rabbis of Holland made a decree that gerim would not be accepted
unless all of the rabbis agreed. This type of decree is a legitimate
approach to protect the Torah and mitzvos against that which can not be
permitted as is stated in Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 228:28). Concerning
the present case where the candidate for conversion wants to accept all
the laws of the Torah but does not want to accept wearing modest
clothing. She wants to wear the clothing that are
worn – due to our many sins – by the average woman of this degenerate
generation. The question is whether to accept her as a valid ger and if
the answer is negative - what is her status if she is accepted anyway?
This requires careful thought. Bechoros (30b) states that a non‑Jew who
comes to accept the entire Torah except for one thing is not to be
accepted. R’ Yose says that he isn’t accepted even if rejects one detail
of a rabbinic halacha. The question is whether this gemora is only
concerning initially whether to accept the candidate as seems from the
language of the gemora or that even if he accepted – he is not a valid
ger? It is certain that gerim are accepted even though they don’t know
most of the laws of the Torah - because we instruct them only in some of
the mitzvos. It is certain that we don’t even teach them most of the
laws of Shabbos. Furthermore we find an even more extreme situation in
that even if the ger doesn’t know any mitzvos he is still a valid ger.
This is stated in Shabbos (68b) that a ger who converts amongst non‑Jews
is liable for one chatas for all the violations on every Shabbos and
prohibited blood and fat and idolatry. Thus we
see that even if he isn’t instructed in a single mitzva or even the
foundations of religious belief he is still a valid ger. That is because
the case in the gemora concerns a person who has accepted upon himself
to do all that a Jew is required to do – and that is sufficient for
valid conversion.
We are not concerned with the possibility that if he
knew this particular mitzva he would not accept it. That is because even
if it were so it is only a mental reservation which has no halachic
significance. Thus informing a candidate for conversion of the nature of
mitzvos is only something that is desirable, but has no halachic
consequence if not done. Therefore we must say that the language of the
Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:3) “all matters of conversion have to be in the
presence of 3 fit to judge whether it is to instruct him about mitzvos
or for his acceptance of mitzvos” – is not to be understood literally.
That is because the point of the Shulchan Aruch is that the acceptance
of mitzvos has to be in the presence of 3 but instructing him about
mitzvos is not required for the validity of the conversion. The reason
the Shulchan Aruch mentions instructing him in mitzvos is because that
is what the beis din does concerning some of the mitzvos
when he accepts the obligation to do mitzvos.
That is in fact the
language of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12) “and even if he is not
informed of the reward and punishment of mitzvos he is still a valid
ger.” This wording of the Shulchan Aruch here is also not precise
because even if the candidate is not instructed at all concerning any
mitzvos – as long as he accepts the obligation to do all the mitzvos
that Jews are required to do – he is still a valid ger. It is only
because it is typically not forgotten to instruct him in some mitzvos
that the Shulchan Aruch mentions that they forgot to instruct him
regarding the reward and punishment of mitzvos – because it is possible
to forget this occasionally. However if they do tell him a particular
mitzva or he knows about it himself since he sees Jews observing it and
he says that he doesn’t accept it – that is the case that Bechoros (30b)
says that he is not accepted as a ger. Therefore
it is possible that in this case even if he was accepted as a ger –
despite his rejection of a particular mitzva – bedieved he would still
not be a valid ger. However Bechoros (30b) says that he is not to be
accepted - which seems to be that he is only not accepted initially if
he rejects any mitzva. Furthermore it would seem
from the statement of R’ Yose in Bechoros (30b) that even if rejects a
single detail of a rabbinic law he is not accepted – it would seem that
since he has accepted every Torah mitzva including not to deviate from
the rabbinic teachings – but at least he would be a ger according to the
Torah. That is because it doesn’t make sense that the Sages would
uproot the Torah level conversion - which is relevant to the validity of
marriage and other matters – and to create a leniency and that this
would not be mentioned openly in the gemora. Therefore
we can conclude that even according to R’ Yose he is only saying not to
accept them initially but if they were accepted – even if they had
rejected a rabbinic law – they are still valid gerim. Furthermore they
would be obligated to keep even the mitzva that they had rejected. That
is because this that they did not accept it has no halachic significance
to exempt them because they are make a condition against that which is
written in the Torah – and therefore the condition is nullified...
Therefore this woman who doesn’t want to accept to wear only modest
clothing should definitely not be accepted initially. However whether
she should be accepted bedieved depends on this doubt and it would seem
more likely that bedieved if she was accepted that she would be a valid
convert. Furthermore concerning whether to accept her initially – any
conversion which is because of marriage even if she accepted the entire
Torah – she should not be accepted.
If so it is certainly is a major
justification for the requirement that all the rabbis of Holland agree
to accept her conversion – even if she accepted all the Torah laws.
Nevertheless it is good that all the rabbis did not agree to accept her
because of her refusal to wear modest clothing. That is because
accepting her with two issues against her is much more serious than if
she only had one. However there is another consideration since because
of our many sins we find that Jewish women also are not careful about
wearing only modest clothing – even those who are Torah observant.
Therefore a non‑Jewish woman who comes to convert might think that
modest clothing in only an act of piety that the rabbis are trying to
impose on her more than is actually required – because she knows women
who are observant and yet wear immodest clothing. And even if the rabbis
tell her that it is actually prohibited and not just an act of piety –
she doesn’t believe them. If so perhaps she should be viewed as
converting without knowing the laws of the Torah and would be considered
a valid ger according to Shabbos (68b)? This seems logical – even
though I don’t have a proof for this presently. Nevertheless with all
things considered it is better not to accept her because she should not
be accepted anyway since the conversion is for the sake of marriage.
Therefore even though people are lenient to accept converts for the sake
of marriage it is not correct to be lenient in additional factors.
Consequently the decree is correct and she should not be accepted
http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2008/05/contrary-to-some-rabbis-conversion-can.html
Rabbi Schertz received his semicha from Yeshiva University in
1969. He also received masters in Jewish Philosophy from YU’s Bernard
Revel Graduate School. He has a second masters in the History of Ideas
from New York University, and a PhD from New York University in
the History of Western Thought. He taught Classics in Pennsylvania
State University and Philosophy at Regis College in Denver, Colorado.
Rabbi Schertz served as the Rabbi of Kesher Israel Congregation in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania for over 25 years and is currently retired and
living in Harrisburg.
In addition to such biblical analysis and exegesis there appears to be a logical underpinning to this conclusion. The Talmud stated in Ketubot 11:a that in cases dealing with minors one may provide them with Judaism without their awareness. This is based on the principle that one may provide another with any benefit [in this case the benefit is Judaism) without the consent or knowledge of the other. The corollary to this concept is that one may not impose any obligation upon another without that person’s awareness or consent. The Talmud assumes that in the case of an adult non-Jew, who has been raised as a non-Jew, the freedom that he enjoys in living as a non-Jew overrides any aspect of Judaism because Judaism entails a host of obligations. He is not anxious to limit his life style by the myriad of obligations which Judaism imposes despite the fact that Judaism may endow him with a higher spiritual life. Any attempt to impose such obligations upon him is tantamount to coercion and has no halachic validity.
The one other objection to the use of coercion is historical by nature. We have stated above that the foundation upon which the principles of conversion were established upon the conversion of the Israelites on Mt. Sinai. This was stated clearly by Maimonidies that in all future generations if a non-Jew wishes to enter the Covenant he must undergo the same ritual and requirements which the ancestors of the Jews underwent in the Wilderness [Issurei Biah 13:4]. This is similarly maintained by the Tosafists [Sanhedrin 68:b, under the heading Katan]. The Tosafists there maintain the various elements which allowed the Israelites to be converted into Jews, including the conversion of children. These principles applied to the future conversion of non-Jews.
Perhaps the most famous example of the invalidity of conversion when duress is an underlying issue, is the matter of the acceptance into Judaism of the Kutites. The Talmud discusses a controversy between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva whether the Kutites, who inhabited the Land of Israel after the Babylonian expulsion, were to be considered true converts (gerei emet) or converts who became so because of their fear of lions that roamed that area (gerei arayot). It is clear that if their conversion resulted from their fear, it was not acceptable in any sense. See Kiddushin 75 b.
The historical circumstances which demonstrated the inapplicability of coercion was stated in Tractate Shabbat 88:a. The Talmud introduced an Aggadic interpretation of the Biblical text which implied that the Israelites camped beneath Mt. Sinai. Rabbi Avimi bar Chama bar Chasa stated that this came to teach that God placed the mountain upon their head and threatened them that if they did not accept the Torah they would be buried in that location, which seems to be a coercive statement. Rav Acha bar Jacov derived from this incident that due to the coercive nature of the act it had no legal or moral authority. Thus, if God should attempt to indict the Jews for non-observance they could always respond that their conversion had no validity because it was done under duress. Rava then stated that the issue of duress was canceled during the days of Achashverous when the Jews willingly accepted their conversion.
We must note that there appears to be one discrepancy in the Book of Esther that may lead to an opposite conclusion. The text states that, “many from the nations of the land became Jews because the fear of the Jews fell upon them” resulting from the king’s decree which empowered Jews (Esther VIII: 17). This implies that conversion which resulted from fear was an acceptable conversion. One could reply to this question by pointing out that the text never stated the normal term for conversion mitgayarim, but rather a unique term mityahadim. That could easily be taken to mean that there was no real conversion, but that these people merely took upon themselves the external appearance of being Jews to avoid calamity. Rashi, however, does interpret that the term mityahadim means mitgayarim i.e. conversion. One could explain this interpretation by noting although the conversions were performed, there is no indication that these conversions were accepted by the rabbinic authorities of that day. This is similar to the case of the Kutites who also converted. If, however, they converted primarily out of fear, then it is agreed that their conversion was invalid.
The passage outlined above in tractate Shabbat 88:a is quite problematic. It implies that from the time of the Exodus until the Persian conquest of the Babylonians, a period of about 700 years, there were no real Jews in the world. One, thus, must understand that this passage is to be seen as hyperbole rather than an accurate historical record. It is important, however, because it demonstrates how much emphasis the Talmud placed upon the requirement that no coercion could be part of the conversion process.
An adult may reject any element of the conversion process with which he does not agree or finds offensive which in turn nullifies the conversion itself as long as it is done prior to the conversion. “If a non-Jew is ready to accept the Torah with the exception of one law we should not accept him as a Jew. Rav Jose the son of Rav Judah says, even if he rejects one point or detail of the laws established by the Scribes ( the Oral Law)” [Bechorot 30:b] In the case of the conversion of minors, following the view of Rabbi Yosef (Ketubot 11:a) upon reaching adulthood they may always reject their prior conversion.
https://yulamdan.com/2015/03/29/on-conversion-to-judaism-by-rabbi-dr-chaim-e-schertz/
The Chemdat Shlomo’s distinction has been
accepted by the overwhelming majority of Poskim. These authorities
include Rav Yitzchak Shmelkes (Teshuvot Beit Yitzchak Y.D. 2:100), Rav
Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook (Teshuvot Da’at Kohen 147), Teshuvot
Devar Avraham (3:28), Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky (Teshuvot Achiezer 3:26
and 28), Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:157), Rav
Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (citing his father in footnote 22 to Kol Dodi
Dofeik), Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:35) and
Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:104).
On Conversion to Judaism, by Rabbi Dr. Chaim E. Schertz
- COERCION AND REJECTION
In addition to such biblical analysis and exegesis there appears to be a logical underpinning to this conclusion. The Talmud stated in Ketubot 11:a that in cases dealing with minors one may provide them with Judaism without their awareness. This is based on the principle that one may provide another with any benefit [in this case the benefit is Judaism) without the consent or knowledge of the other. The corollary to this concept is that one may not impose any obligation upon another without that person’s awareness or consent. The Talmud assumes that in the case of an adult non-Jew, who has been raised as a non-Jew, the freedom that he enjoys in living as a non-Jew overrides any aspect of Judaism because Judaism entails a host of obligations. He is not anxious to limit his life style by the myriad of obligations which Judaism imposes despite the fact that Judaism may endow him with a higher spiritual life. Any attempt to impose such obligations upon him is tantamount to coercion and has no halachic validity.
The one other objection to the use of coercion is historical by nature. We have stated above that the foundation upon which the principles of conversion were established upon the conversion of the Israelites on Mt. Sinai. This was stated clearly by Maimonidies that in all future generations if a non-Jew wishes to enter the Covenant he must undergo the same ritual and requirements which the ancestors of the Jews underwent in the Wilderness [Issurei Biah 13:4]. This is similarly maintained by the Tosafists [Sanhedrin 68:b, under the heading Katan]. The Tosafists there maintain the various elements which allowed the Israelites to be converted into Jews, including the conversion of children. These principles applied to the future conversion of non-Jews.
Perhaps the most famous example of the invalidity of conversion when duress is an underlying issue, is the matter of the acceptance into Judaism of the Kutites. The Talmud discusses a controversy between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva whether the Kutites, who inhabited the Land of Israel after the Babylonian expulsion, were to be considered true converts (gerei emet) or converts who became so because of their fear of lions that roamed that area (gerei arayot). It is clear that if their conversion resulted from their fear, it was not acceptable in any sense. See Kiddushin 75 b.
The historical circumstances which demonstrated the inapplicability of coercion was stated in Tractate Shabbat 88:a. The Talmud introduced an Aggadic interpretation of the Biblical text which implied that the Israelites camped beneath Mt. Sinai. Rabbi Avimi bar Chama bar Chasa stated that this came to teach that God placed the mountain upon their head and threatened them that if they did not accept the Torah they would be buried in that location, which seems to be a coercive statement. Rav Acha bar Jacov derived from this incident that due to the coercive nature of the act it had no legal or moral authority. Thus, if God should attempt to indict the Jews for non-observance they could always respond that their conversion had no validity because it was done under duress. Rava then stated that the issue of duress was canceled during the days of Achashverous when the Jews willingly accepted their conversion.
We must note that there appears to be one discrepancy in the Book of Esther that may lead to an opposite conclusion. The text states that, “many from the nations of the land became Jews because the fear of the Jews fell upon them” resulting from the king’s decree which empowered Jews (Esther VIII: 17). This implies that conversion which resulted from fear was an acceptable conversion. One could reply to this question by pointing out that the text never stated the normal term for conversion mitgayarim, but rather a unique term mityahadim. That could easily be taken to mean that there was no real conversion, but that these people merely took upon themselves the external appearance of being Jews to avoid calamity. Rashi, however, does interpret that the term mityahadim means mitgayarim i.e. conversion. One could explain this interpretation by noting although the conversions were performed, there is no indication that these conversions were accepted by the rabbinic authorities of that day. This is similar to the case of the Kutites who also converted. If, however, they converted primarily out of fear, then it is agreed that their conversion was invalid.
The passage outlined above in tractate Shabbat 88:a is quite problematic. It implies that from the time of the Exodus until the Persian conquest of the Babylonians, a period of about 700 years, there were no real Jews in the world. One, thus, must understand that this passage is to be seen as hyperbole rather than an accurate historical record. It is important, however, because it demonstrates how much emphasis the Talmud placed upon the requirement that no coercion could be part of the conversion process.
An adult may reject any element of the conversion process with which he does not agree or finds offensive which in turn nullifies the conversion itself as long as it is done prior to the conversion. “If a non-Jew is ready to accept the Torah with the exception of one law we should not accept him as a Jew. Rav Jose the son of Rav Judah says, even if he rejects one point or detail of the laws established by the Scribes ( the Oral Law)” [Bechorot 30:b] In the case of the conversion of minors, following the view of Rabbi Yosef (Ketubot 11:a) upon reaching adulthood they may always reject their prior conversion.
https://yulamdan.com/2015/03/29/on-conversion-to-judaism-by-rabbi-dr-chaim-e-schertz/
Teshuvot Chemdat Shlomo (Y.D. 29-30, referenced
in the Pitchei Teshuvah 268:9) draws a fundamental distinction between
Hoda’at Mitzvot and Kabblat Mitzvot. Chemdat Shlomo argues that
although Hoda’at Mitzvot is not essential, Kabbalat Mitzvot is crucial.
The convert’s commitment to observe (all) Mitzvot signifies the core of the
conversion. If in a peculiar case the Beit Din mistakenly failed to
inform the convert of the Torah’s obligations, the Geirut is acceptable
BeDiEved.
However, if the convert is not committed to accept the
Torah’s rules when he finds out what they are, the conversion is
invalid.
These authorities
rule that if a covert did not commit to observing the Torah, the
conversion is invalid.
Thus, were a non-Jew to be convinced (coerced) to undergo a conversion ceremony
but is fully aware eating shellfish is forbidden by Jewish religious law and
has no intention of observing those strictures, his or her mouthing of a
mitigated “kabbalat hamitzvot” does not result in a conversion.
Rabbi Feinstein Igrot Moshe. In
number 157 he writes:
… it is obvious and clear that [a non-Jew who did not accept (all) the mitzvot] is not a convert at all, even after the fact [of his conversion ceremony]… because kabbalat hamitzvot for a convert is essential [“me’akev”]. And even if he pronounces that he is accepting the mitzvot, if it is clear to us [“anan sa’hadi”] that he is not in truth accepting them, it is nothing.
And Rabbi Feinstein, concludes:
I altogether do not understand the reasoning of rabbis who err in this. Even according to [their mistaken notion], what gain are they bringing to the Jewish People by accepting such ‘converts’? It is certainly not pleasing to G-d or to the Jewish people that such ‘converts’ should become mixed into [the Congregation of] Israel. As to the halacha, it is clear that they are not converts at all.***
Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner celebrated Kushner’s 31st birthday with an intimate dinner rather than a blowout Tuesday, when they were seen at “a cozy corner table” at Jesse Schenker’s West Village hot spot Recette. Spies say the pair nibbled on hamachi with uni, fluke with shellfish congee and s’mores with graham cracker ice cream, topped off by a candle. Trump then presented her hubby with two maroon Polo Ralph Lauren waffle shirts and other gifts.
http://pagesix.com/2012/01/12/private-b-day/
