The High Price of Rejecting the Iran Deal
Those
calling on Congress to scrap the deal argue that the United States
could have gotten a better deal, and still could, if we unilaterally
ramped up existing sanctions, enough to force Iran to dismantle its
entire nuclear program or even alter the character of its regime
wholesale. This assumption is a dangerous fantasy, flying in the face of
economic and diplomatic reality.
To
be sure, the United States does have tremendous economic influence. But
it was not this influence alone that persuaded countries across Europe
and Asia to join the current sanction policy, one that required them to
make costly sacrifices, curtail their purchases of Iran’s oil, and put
Iran’s foreign reserves in escrow. They joined us because we made the
case that Iran’s nuclear program was an uncontained threat to global
stability and, most important, because we offered a concrete path to
address it diplomatically — which we did.
In
the eyes of the world, the nuclear agreement — endorsed by the United
Nations Security Council and more than 90 other countries — addresses
the threat of Iran’s nuclear program by constraining it for the long
term and ensuring that it will be exclusively peaceful. If Congress now
rejects this deal, the elements that were fundamental in establishing
that international consensus will be gone.
The
simple fact is that, after two years of testing Iran in negotiations,
the international community does not believe that ramping up sanctions
will persuade Iran to eradicate all traces of its hard-won civil nuclear
program or sever its ties to its armed proxies in the region. Foreign
governments will not continue to make costly sacrifices at our demand.
Indeed,
they would more likely blame us for walking away from a credible
solution to one of the world’s greatest security threats, and would
continue to re-engage with Iran. Instead of toughening the sanctions, a
decision by Congress to unilaterally reject the deal would end a decade
of isolation of Iran and put the United States at odds with the rest of
the world.
Some
critics nevertheless argue that we can force the hands of these
countries by imposing powerful secondary sanctions against those that
refuse to follow our lead.
But
that would be a disaster. The countries whose cooperation we need —
including those in the European Union, China, Japan, India and South
Korea, as well as the companies and banks that handle their oil
purchases and hold foreign reserves — are among the largest economies in
the world. If we were to cut them off from the American dollar and our
financial system, we would set off extensive financial hemorrhaging, not
just in our partner countries but in the United States as well.
Our
strong, open economic relations with these countries constitute a
foundation of the global economy. Nearly 40 percent of American exports
go to the European Union, China, Japan, India and Korea — trade that
cannot continue without banking connections.
The
major importers of Iranian oil — China, India, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and Turkey — together account for nearly a fifth of our goods
exports and own 47 percent of foreign-held American treasuries. They
will not agree to indefinite economic sacrifices in the name of an
illusory better deal. We should think very seriously before threatening
to cripple the largest banks and companies in these countries.
Consider
the Bank of Japan, a key institutional holder of Iran’s foreign
reserves. Cutting off Japan from the American banking system through
sanctions would mean that we could not honor our sovereign
responsibility to service and repay the more than $1 trillion in
American treasuries held by Japan’s central bank. And those would be
direct consequences of our sanctions, not to mention the economic
aftershocks and the inevitable retaliation.
We
must remember recent history. In 1996, in the absence of any other
international support for imposing sanctions on Iran, Congress tried to
force the hands of foreign companies, creating secondary sanctions that
threatened to penalize them for investing in Iran’s energy sector. The
idea was to force international oil companies to choose between doing
business with Iran or the United States, with the expectation that all
would choose us.
This
outraged our foreign partners, particularly the European Union, which
threatened retaliatory action and referral to the World Trade
Organization and passed its own law prohibiting companies from
complying. The largest oil companies of Europe and Asia stayed in Iran
until, more than a decade later, we built a global consensus around the
threat posed by Iran and put forward a realistic diplomatic means of
addressing it.
The
deal we reached last month is strong, unprecedented and good for
America, with all the key elements the international community demanded
to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Congress should approve this
deal and ignore critics who offer no alternative.
Jacob J. Lew is the secretary of the Treasury.
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