How
can an Orthodox Jew in today's world maintain faith in Torah in the
face of the apparent challenges of natural science to that faith? I will
here examine Maimonides' approach to the issue and then propose my own
approach, one which relies upon reverting to what I understand as
classic Jewish definitions of faith.
Before
beginning I should like to note that I think that my task is relatively
simple. Real challenges to Orthodoxy today do not come from the natural
sciences but from literary criticism and history, which cast doubt upon
the textual integrity of the Written Torah and upon Orthodox
understandings of the nature of the Oral Torah;[2]
from ethics, which challenges traditional Jewish understandings of the
relationship of the sexes and of Jews and non-Jews, among other
problems;[3] and from Enlightenment thought generally, which emphasizes the value of autonomy over faithful submission to God.[4]
How
did Maimonides approach the reconciliation of Torah and science? He
starts off by taking the text of the Torah as literally true in every
case: "I believe every possible happening that is supported by a
prophetic statement and do not strip it of its plain meaning."[5]
But, there is an exception to this general rule: "I fall back on
interpreting a statement [allegorically] only when its plain meaning is
impossible, like the corporeality of God; the possible however remains
as stated." What makes prophetic references to God as corporeal
impossible to accept? Maimonides tells us in the Guide of the Perplexed
(II.25, p. 328): "That the deity is not a body has been demonstrated;
from this it follows necessarily that everything that in its plain
meaning disagrees with this demonstration must be interpreted
figuratively, for it is known that such texts are of necessity fit for
figurative interpretation."
Maimonides'
point is relatively straightforward: the Torah must be accepted as
literally true in every case where its teachings do not contradict that
which has been demonstrated to be true. By demonstration, Maimonides
means "a syllogism both of whose premises are apodictic."[6]
Maimonides'
position clearly makes demonstrated truth to be the criterion we use
for determining which passages in the Torah we read literally, and which
passages we read allegorically. If a scientific claim is demonstrably
true, and the plain sense of Scripture contradicts it, we may not ignore
or reinterpret the scientific claim; we must, rather, reinterpret
Scripture. To all intents and purposes, science becomes our measure for
understanding the Torah.[7]
Maimonides
could be confident that this approach would cause him no problems
since, at their deepest levels, Torah and science taught the same thing.
Maimonides clearly states that ma'aseh bereshit is the rabbinic name for that area of study called by the philosophers, “physics,” and ma'aseh merkavah is the rabbinic name for that area of study called by the philosophers, “metaphysics”.
Maimonides
had further reason for calm: the sciences he was concerned with,
physics and metaphysics, proved that which he wanted them to prove, that
God exists, is one, and is incorporeal. It is acceptance of these three
beliefs, as taught by science, that Maimonides construes as the first
commandment, “the great principle upon which all depends” ("Laws of the
Foundations of the Torah," I.6), the “foundation of all foundations and
pillar of the sciences” ( I.1). Monotheism is the central axis around
which the entire Torah revolves, denial of which is tantamount to denial
of the Torah in its entirety.
In
short, as long as science does not refute the existence, unity, and
incorporeality of God –and it appears that there is no way it could –
progress in the sciences in no way threatens acceptance of the Torah and
obedience to the commandments.
Maimonides opened his magisterial law code, Mishneh Torah with the following statement (here translated loosely):
The
most important principle of all the principles of the Torah, and the
fundamental axiom of all the sciences is the same, to wit, to know that
there exists a First Existent, that It gives existence to all that
exists, and that all existent beings, from the heaven to the earth and
what is between them, exist only due to the truth of Its existence.
Knowing this, Maimonides goes on to say, is a positive commandment – indeed the first positive commandment in his Book of Commandments, not to mention the first of the 'Thirteen Principles'.
In making these claims Maimonides imports science (in the guise of ma'aseh bereshit, Greek physics, and ma'aseh merkavah,
Greek metaphysics) into the very heart of Torah. Indeed the Twentieth
Century's leading Maimonidean, Rabbi Josef Kafih, went so far as to deny
the possibility of secular studies (limmudei hol) for Maimonides: if a discipline yields truth, it is not secular.
Moreover,
to know something, for Maimonides (following Aristotle), is to know it
through or with its causes. The first commandment of the Torah is to know that God exists; and, as Maimonides makes clear in the Introduction to the Guide of the Perplexed, the only way to fulfill that commandment is through the study of physics and metaphysics.
The implications of this are vast:
- The study of science becomes incumbent upon all Jews who want to fulfill even the first commandment of the Torah.
- Psychoanalysis
may be a Jewish science, as its opponents claimed, and Lysenko's
biology was certainly socialist 'science', but surely no reader of this
book would claim that there can be a Jewish physics or Jewish
metaphysics. Thus, the science which Jews are commanded to study is
precisely that science which is taught (for Maimonides) by uncircumcised
Greeks and oppressive Muslims.
- One who has mastered what Maimonides calls (in the Introduction to the Guide of the Perplexed)
the legal science of the Torah (i.e., the Talmudist) is thus inferior
to one who has mastered the secrets of the Torah, i.e., the person who
understands physics and metaphysics. (It is no wonder that many who read
Maimonides expostulate: "This is Greek to me!" and that medieval rabbis
wanted to burn or at least excise the 51st chapter of the third part of the Guide.)
Truth
is absolute and objective; there can thus be no such things as
intellectual (or spiritual) authority per se. Statements are true
irrespective of the standing of the person making them. Maimonides could
thus have no patience for the sorts of claims to rabbinic authority
which underlie the contemporary doctrine of da'at Torah (charismatic rabbinic authority) in its various permutations.[8]
Thus
far Maimonides, for whom natural science meant physics, who operated in
a theistic universe, and for whom the greatest question posed by
science was whether or not the world was created. What of contemporary
thinkers, whose natural universe gets along quite well, thank you,
without a final cause, confronted by the claims of geology,
paleontology, and evolution, all of which demand far greater liberties
with the "plain meaning" of Scripture than did Maimonides' naturalistic
explanation of various miracles (but no greater liberty, I should note,
than that demanded by his radically non-anthropomorphic reading of
verses attributing corporeality to God)?[9]
Maimonides'
position, challenging as it is to many contemporary conceptions of
Orthodoxy, relies for its cogency upon conceptions of demonstrative
truth foreign to the present-day scientific enterprise. Since little
that science teaches today is demonstrably true in Maimonides' sense,
his position offers us no guidance on how to relate Torah and science in
the contemporary world.
Much
of contemporary Orthodoxy has, it appears, backed itself into something
of a corner with respect to the question of science and Torah. It has
rather unreflectively adopted a kind of quasi-Maimonideanism according
to which Judaism teaches truth in much the same way that science teaches
truth. What brings Orthodoxy to adopt this stance? It makes two crucial
assumptions, or, I should say, accepts two Maimonidean teachings which
lock it into this position. The first concerns the "centrality of
faith-commitments in Judaism" and the second the idea that Judaism
recognizes a category of "commandments addressed to the intellect."[10]
Much
of Orthodoxy today holds, in the words of Rabbi J. David Bleich, that
"basic philosophical beliefs are not simply matters of intellectual
curiosity but constitute a branch of Halakhah" and that matters of dogma
are decided like other areas of halakhah. Bleich has recently
reiterated the same position: "matters of belief," he maintains, "are
inherently matters of halakha. It is not at all surprising that
disagreements exist with regard to substantive matters of belief, just
as is the case with regard to other areas of Jewish law. Such matters
are subject to the canons of halakhic decision-making no less than other
questions of Jewish law."[11]
This position invites conflicts between science and Torah since matters
of belief include issues under the purview of the sciences. That is
what Maimonides did; but how many of today's Orthodox Jews who agree
with this position today would be willing to follow Maimonides in making
"demonstration" (i.e., science) the arbiter of what the Torah means?[12]
There
are a number of things which have to be said in response to this sort
of position. First, I think that it misrepresents Maimonides: basic
philosophical beliefs are neither simply matters of intellectual curiosity nor a branch of halakhah. They are attempts to understand the true nature of the universe to the greatest extent possible. Ma'aseh bereshit is the rabbinic term for what the Greeks called physics; ma'aseh merkavah
is the rabbinic expression for what the Greeks called metaphysics – and
these two are called the "roots" of the specific halakhot (gufei Torah).
Considering that these roots are either true or false absolutely, it is
literally inconceivable that Maimonides could have held that their
truth status depends upon rabbinic psak (decision), as would be
the case were they matters of halakhah. This leads to my second point:
can we seriously credit the idea that Maimonides would have held that
before he "paskened" (decided halakhically) that Moses was superior to
all the other prophets before and after him, for example, that the
question was undecided in Judaism? Similarly, of course, with respect to
the other twelve of the Thirteen Principles. Of course not. Third, even
were this understanding of Maimonides correct, the latter's position is
quite clearly an innovation in Judaism and it is simply incorrect to read it back into rabbinic texts.[13]
None
of this is meant to minimize the contribution of Maimonides to Judaism.
Maimonides' position that truth is objective and must be accepted
whatever its source[14]
and his willingness to understand the Torah such that it cannot
conflict with the teachings of reason are two aspects of his thought
that make it possible for many people today to remain faithful to Torah
and Judaism without feeling that they must turn off their brains. These
teachings concerning Judaism only make sense if we insist that the Torah
addresses the intellect and not just the limbs.[15]
But
if the Torah contains the truth, why not command its acceptance, or at
the very least, teach it in a very clear and unambiguous fashion? The
reason is that for Bible and Talmud the translation of ultimate truth
into clearly defined and manageable statements was less a pressing need
than it was for Maimonides. Let me put this as follows: Maimonides and
the Talmud agree that God's truth is embodied in the Torah. The Talmud
finds pressing the need to determine the practical, this-worldly
consequences of that truth, while Maimonides, in addition, finds its
necessary to determine the specific, cognitive content of that truth. On
one level, Maimonides is clearly right: Judaism does teach truth; but,
on the other hand, his insistence on expressing that truth in specific
teachings is an innovation in Judaism.
The
point I am trying to make here comes out in the well-known talmudic
story concerning the oven of Akhnai (Bava Mezia 59b). The Sages debated
whether a particular kind of oven could become ritually impure. The text
says:
On
that day R. Eliezer brought all the answers in the world [to support
his position] but they were not accepted. He said to them: "If the
halakhah accords with my opinion, let this carob tree prove it!" The
carob tree uprooted itself and moved 100 amot [c. 50 yards] – some say,
it was 400 amot. The [other] rabbis said to him: "One does not bring a
proof from a carob tree." He continued, saying "If the halakhah accords
with my opinion, let this pool of water prove it!" The water thereupon
flowed backwards. They said to him: "One does not bring a proof from a
pool of water." He continued, saying "If the halakhah accords with my
opinion, let the walls of this house of study prove it!" The walls of
the house of study thereupon began to fall inward. Rabbi Joshua reproved
them [the walls]: "By what right do you interfere when Sages battle
each other over halakhah?" The walls did not fall [all the way] out of
respect for R. Joshua and did not stand upright [again] out of respect
for R. Eliezer. To this day, they stand at an angle. He then said to
them, "If the halakhah accords with my opinion, let it be proved by
Heaven!" A voice from Heaven [immediately] spoke forth: "How do you
disagree with R. Eliezer, when the halakhah accords with his opinion in
every place?"[16] R. Joshua then stood upon his legs and said, It is not in Heaven! [Deut 30: 12]. [The Talmud then asks,] "What is the significance of It is not in Heaven?"
R. Jeremiah said, "Since the Torah was given at Mt. Sinai we pay no
attention to voices from Heaven [in determining halakhah] since You
[i.e., God, the source of heavenly voices] have already written in the
Torah at Mt. Sinai, turn aside after a multitude [Exodus 23:2].
R. Nathan met Elijah and said to him, "What did the Holy One, blessed
be He, do when this happened?" Elijah replied: "He smiled and said, 'My
children have defeated me! My children have defeated me!'."
Much
can be (and has been!) said about this fascinating passage. Here it
will suffice to quote an insightful comment of David Kraemer's: "Of
course, we must assume that if the heavenly voice supported R. Eliezer's
view, his view must have been closer to the 'truth.' Nevertheless, his
truth is rejected, and the view of the sages, though objectively in
error, is affirmed."[17]
Judaism teaches truth, and that fact must never be forgotten. But the
ultimate truth taught by the Torah need not necessarily be understood in
its detailed specificity for us to live in the world in a decent
fashion; while there is one objective "truth," the Talmud is interested
in arriving at a halakhic determination, rather than at a determinate
understanding of the final truth. We can safely put off determining the
exact truth until the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea (Isaiah 11:9);[18] but in the meantime we must know how to live.[19]
This
talmudic position, I think, makes it possible for Jews to reach
ever-greater understandings of the truth taught by the Torah and allows
them to express that truth in language appropriate to each age. Had
Judaism adopted a Maimonidean, as opposed to talmudic, understanding of
the nature of our relation to the truth taught by the Torah, we would be
forced to express our vision of the Universe in terms of the
Neoplatonized Aristotelianism adopted by Maimonides. Our situation would
be similar to that of Habad hasidim, who feel constrained to accept
Maimonides' Ptolemaic description of the physical universe as "Torah
from heaven," or to that of those Catholics who accept Thomism as
normative and authoritative. But "the Torah is not in heaven" – it must
be lived in this world, while the absolute truth which it embodies
remains "from heaven," a constant challenge to our understanding, a
constant critique of our tendency to intellectual complacency. The
talmudic position, as hinted at in the story of the oven of Akhnai,
allows Judaism to live and breathe in today's world as much as in
yesterday's.
Maimonides,
I have argued in a number of places, understood religious faith
primarily in terms of propositions affirmed or denied. Bible and Talmud
understood religious faith primarily in terms of trust and loyalty. This
being so, "orthodoxy" is actually a misnomer, since Judaism, before
Maimonides, knew no doctrines (=doxos) concerning which one absolutely
had to be clearly and self-consciously "straight" (=ortho).
It is further important to realize that even though classical Judaism does not understand the nature of emunah
as Maimonides does, and therefore places little value and emphasis on
precise theological formulations, there are limits to what one can
affirm or deny and still remain within the Jewish community. Note my
terminology here: there are limits to what one can affirm or deny and
still remain with the Jewish community. Denying the unity of God,
for example, or that the Torah is of divine origin in some significant
sense, or affirming that the Messiah has already come, are claims which
place one outside of the historical community of Israel.
Returning
to the issue of "faith, science, and Orthodoxy," I am here proposing
that we understand Jewish faith in terms of loyalty to God, Torah, and Israel,
loyalty which finds expression in the fulfillment of the commandments
and less as "commandments addressed to the intellect." It follows from
this that the criterion for what we now call "Orthodoxy" should be
construed less in terms of adherence to specific dogmas and more in
terms of behavior which evinces trust in God. I further propose that we
follow Maimonides in taking demonstrated truth to be the arbiter of how
we understand Torah. But since we are not yet in the age of the Messiah,
and the knowledge of the Lord does not yet cover the earth as the
waters cover the sea, that means that we understand neither science nor
Torah fully. One does not have to be a fan of Star Trek to know that we
live in age in which we expect our scientific paradigms to change. One
can be a fully "Orthodox" Jew and maintain that, yes, the Torah teaches
truth, but that we do not yet really understand that truth.
In
concrete terms, I am calling for modesty, both as scientists and as
believers. Modesty yes, a total suspension of belief/disbelief, no. To
reject the claim that the earth is vastly old, for example, is not only
to reject the science of geology, but the entire edifice of contemporary
physics and chemistry. The cosmos simply cannot be 5769 years old.
This, of course, is only a problem for the most stubborn of Biblical
literalists. But how about Noah's flood? There is no geological or
archeological evidence that the entire earth was once covered by water;
nor is it possible for humanity, in its rich diversity, to have
developed and spread over the globe in the roughly four and one half
millennia which have passed since the time of Noah. In these and other
matters, the Written Torah cannot be taken literally without rejecting
the crushingly overwhelming weight of scientific evidence.
But
in many other, and more important areas, we may not fully understand
the Torah, but science has not yet had its last word either: on God's
existence, the creation of the cosmos, Sinaitic revelation, providence,
prophecy, miracles, efficacy of prayer, the special relationship of God
to the Jewish people, divine retribution, etc., science seems to have
little definite to say to us, and it appears to me, is not likely to
have much to say in the foreseeable future.
In the final analysis, if we are really to use the eyes God gave us,[20] we can do no other but revert to a qualified Maimonideanism: the Torah cannot contradict that which has been proven
scientifically but science often proves less than what some scientists
think they have proven. We must live in a world of fewer absolutes than
many thinkers (rabbis and scientists alike) would like: the Torah cannot
teach what science rejects as false, but the evidence of science is not
yet fully in, so we do not yet know what the Torah really teaches.[21]
https://www.jewishideas.org/article/faith-science-and-orthodoxy
