The war as an intelligence lab, understanding the failure leading to Hamas massacre
Analysis: The roots of the present catastrophe are not limited to the events of the night between October 6 and 7 but reflect an extreme and long-lasting lack of understanding of the enemy
An IDF tank overtaken by Gaza residents during the Hamas massacre on Oct. 7
The current discourse is nothing more than a fervent search for keys under the streetlight. The point of departure is that intelligence experts have sharp minds, and therefore, the search for flaws and suggested solutions should focus primarily on this aspect.
Thus, ideas are raised for improving thinking and assessment formulation designs and processes (particularly the groupthink challenge), as well as for developing new methodologies, enhancing control systems, revisiting technology’s dominance in intelligence work, or optimizing the relations between various intelligence organizations.
The analysis of the defects does not include two other aspects that are viewed as secondary. The first – the behavioral/personality dimension that plays a key role in all modern-day intelligence failures, including October 7.
Intelligence work is spearheaded by people with extraordinary qualities, but they are not immune to the fundamentals that are often found to underlie any disaster: self-assuredness; arrogance; dogmatism; difficulty in doubting and encouraging pluralism; as well as profound knowledge gaps with regard to the nature and logic of their objects of study.
Senior intelligence officers spoke of the lessons learned from the past, primarily the need for humility and caution, while being blind to the fact that they themselves were symptomatic of the same disease
This point is further accentuated in view of the October 7 fiasco occurring precisely half a century after that of the Yom Kippur War. In the weeks that led up to October 7, events were held to mark 50 years to the 1973 War, during which senior intelligence officers spoke of the lessons learned from the past, primarily the need for humility and caution while being blind to the fact that they themselves were symptomatic of the same disease that soon swept them up in a whirlwind no less shocking than the Yom Kippur War. One possible solution is commanders and consultants who alert to personal behavioral patterns that impact professional work.
The second aspect that has been overlooked is far more grievous, and pertains to the portrait of intelligence officers, as well as to the world of knowledge with which they are charged. Limited familiarity with the basic characteristics of their objects of study, who operate in a culture very different from our own, is an issue that has already been raised in the inquiry into the 1973 debacle. But although understood, it was not addressed, and so – as overlooked malfunctions tend to do – was preserved, enhanced, and ultimately erupted with great force. In recent decades, fewer Israelis are fluent in Arabic and proficient in the region’s culture and history, but, while true for Israeli society as a whole, this issue is of particular significance among intelligence officers tasked with cracking the logic that drives “the other side.”
This state of affairs reflects a severe crisis few are aware of or discuss with which the intelligence profession has been contending in recent decades in Israel and worldwide. Over the years, intelligence has transformed from a vivacious experience that centers primarily on people, and should therefore rely on the tools essential to analyzing their psyche, to a form of science reliant upon complex methodologies and philosophical conundrum-cracking, which gradually steered clear of focusing on individuals, especially those affiliated with other cultures.
It is against this backdrop that the portrait of intelligence officers has been shaped, including the skills they are required to possess, the assignments they are required to complete, and how they are to be trained. Their minds are sharp and they are far more knowledgeable now due to information explosion, but their understanding of the reality that they are researching has diminished.
When the roots of a failure remain untouched, it is no surprise that past flaws resurface, headed by the tendency to impose our own logic on our object of study
The roots of the present catastrophe are not limited to the events of the night between October 6 and 7. This failure reflects an extreme and long-lasting lack of understanding of the enemy. The intelligence inquiry cannot end with a description of the roots of the misconception, but must proceed to analyze how it was formed, why it had endured for as long as it did, and why it was so widely held as a “solid truth.” The lessons raised thus far with regard to the roots of the intelligence fiasco can be likened to the advice of a plastic surgeon pursuing aesthetics when the touch of a geneticist is needed to break down the intelligence officers’ DNA and critically examine its effectiveness in view of the assignments they are required to complete.
When the roots of a failure remain untouched, it is no surprise that past flaws resurface, headed by the tendency to impose our own logic on our object of study, as reflected in the economic arrangement conception vis-à-vis Gaza, as well as the notion that Hamas is undergoing an “evolution” that is lessening its adherence to its extreme ideological vision. This problem is reflected in a document recently drafted by Israeli military intelligence on the roots of the misconception, arguing that the intelligence misunderstood that the enemy was not driven by “rational logic” but by “jihadi instinct.” The same was said of Yahya Sinwar in the years that led to October 7, exempting the intelligence agencies from the need to deeply analyze the enemy’s logic by claiming it is irrational.
The ongoing war serves as an intelligence lab for identifying gaps and validating competence: October 7 revealed a flaw in the ability to alert to war founded on the difficulty of understanding the enemy; the Israeli surprise in view of the Iranian attack in April 2024 – following the strike against the consulate in Damascus – also reflected a gap in assessing the enemy’s logic; and the surprising collapse of Assad’s regime revealed a lack of understanding of in-depth processes and formation dynamics.
A poignant analysis of the roots of October 7 must cause unease among intelligence officers, not only because they had failed to alert to the enemy’s intentions and had misread the latter, but because many of them are not well-versed in the enemy’s language and cultural codes – essential components in the toolbox of those who engage in cultures that are not their own, such as historians, journalists, and, of course, intelligence officers. The latter must recognize that technology and methodology cannot make up for profound understandings.